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VIRTUE OF ATTUNEMENT:  
CONTRIBUTIONS OF YUASA YASUO’S EMBODIED SELF-CULTIVATION 
PRACTICES TO TED TOADVINE’S ECOPHENOMENOLOGY OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Introduction: Rise in Environmentalism 
Environmental consciousness has been on the rise in modern social life. Environmental 
issues are gaining increased recognition and environmental movements are occurring on both the 
macro and micro level.  The dramatic increase of macro-level institutional reform of the last 
several decades have pushed a substantive amount of environmentally-friendly policies. Notable 
manifestations include major developments in sustainable energy. For example, the United States 
Department of Energy has “doubled renewable energy generation from wind, solar, and 
geothermal sources since 2008.”  A parallel cultural movement is simultaneously occurring on 12
the micro, community-level.  Green initiatives have seen growing popularity in activities such as 
urban gardening, bike culture, and ‘eco-’ businesses, which are rapidly appearing across the 
country.   While it does not seem that these trends adequately address serious environmental 3
changes such as global warming, flooding, deforestation, and pollution, they do suggest that 
there is a normative push to reevaluate one’s relatedness to the environment at a personal level. 
1 The White House, “American Made Energy,” Energy and Environment, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/snapshots/american-made-energy (accessed April 9, 2013). 
2 Other contemporary developments include the first National Ocean Policy that protects ocean health, 
expansive land conservation policy, reducing mountain-top removal coal mining, and incentives to curb air pollution 
in motor vehicles.  More examples and information can be found at the White House website: The White House, 
Energy and Environment, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy (accessed March 7, 2013).  While there are long roots 
of American Environmentalism, there has been a serious spike in the environmental movement starting in 1970 with 
the creation of Earth Day.  Earth Day pushed ​the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, and finally the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. For more 
information, examine Philip Shabecoff, ​Earth Rising: American Environmentalism in the 21​st​ Century ​(Washington 
D.C.: Island Press, 2000). 
3 To look at an example of growing urban farming initiatives, see Zusha Elinson, “Urban Farming for Cash 
Gains a Toehold in San Francisco,” ​The Bay Citizen, ​13 August 2010, 





1.1 Rise in Environmental Ethics 
The rise in environmental consciousness has been accompanied by normative analysis 
and response.  Environmental ethics has seen significant growth within the last several decades 
as a way to understand our relatedness to the environment.  The breadth of environmental ethics 4
covers expansive ground.  Implications of environmental ethics have substantial impact on all 
aspects of life.  It can affect how we teach our responsibilities and understanding of the 
environment in the public school system, influence political decisions, and change economic 
development.  The question of relatedness is also critical in understanding the relationship 
between self, others, and the surrounding space that we occupy.  Environmental ethics has grown 
broadly as it tries to reconcile the many possibilities and concerns.  Before I go into specific 
examples, I wish to elaborate on the idea of environmental ethics. 
1.1.1 What is Environmental Ethics?​ Environmental ethics can be described as the 
responsibilities toward the environment.  What sort of notions arise when one thinks of the 
environment in the context of environmental ethics? Often, it is connected to an idea of ‘Nature,’ 
a large category that includes trees, animals, water, air, glaciers, river, etc.  They point to a 
conception of nature that is the original, pristine state untouched by the human hand.  While this 
notion of ‘Nature’ is undoubtedly important especially in terms of conservation, I think it might 
also be an oversimplification.  It is not unusual that expansive categories such as Nature are 
reduced for the sake of practicality and manageability.  However, it tends to emphasize ‘exotic 
4 By doing a search of Environmental Ethics readers in the Oberlin College database, 20 of the books are 
from the 2000s, 13 from the 1990s, 5 from the 1980s, and 2 from 1970.  We can see the significant growth of 




places,’ like tropical rainforests, and deemphasize other environments such as cityscapes, farms, 
parks, homes, etc. It deemphasizes the lived environments of humans.   5
I am looking for an environmental ethic that acknowledges the environments that humans 
immediately live in. It should explore the normative ways to live in any environment, and 
address the encounters we have with others with whom we share our surroundings. The ‘Other’ 
is everything that is not a part of the individually understood self.  It includes other people and 
things.  It also comprises of the Nature understood as the pristine wilderness as well as nature 
that is in our backyards.   My environmental ethics is therefore not only geared for 
environmental policy, although I definitely think it can contribute to that. It is also seeking an 
ethics of living in the world where there is a responsibility to our surroundings and a 
responsibility to others. While not every environmental ethicist may agree, here are two 
important examples of contemporary environmental ethics that do: Land Ethic and Deep 
Ecology. 
One of the first influential approaches to contemporary environmental ethics is Land 
Ethic, made popular by Aldo Leopold.  Leopold extends the biotic community to include 6
animals, plants, soils, water, minerals, etc. into what he collectively calls the Land.  Intrinsic 
value is placed on the integrity, stability, and beauty of the Land.  Within this ethic, however, 
excessive growth is seen as a danger to stability. For example, if there was excessive growth of 
deer, a land ethicist would agree that the most ethical response would be to control and decrease 
their population.  This has very problematic implications on human communities, especially 
5 A convincing and informative social critique of the term ‘wilderness” is presented by William Cronon, 
“The Trouble with Wilderness: or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” ​Environmental History ​1, no. 1 (January 
1996): 7-28. 
6 Aldo Leopold​,​ “The Land Ethic,” in​ Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works​, eds. 




those in dense and populated areas.  It could discourage social services to impoverished city 
communities, propagating certain social, class, and racial conceptions. 
Another popular environmental ethic that has grown from the Land Ethic is called Deep 
Ecology.  It declares the intrinsic value of all living things because everything is interconnected 7
within a harmonious web of life.  This monistic picture projects humans as a continuation of 
nature.  Humans are one more part or extension of natural perfection.  One concern that may 
arise is how to adequately attend to issues in which one species must be eliminated for the 
livelihood of another.  For example, a deep ecologist might have difficulty justifying scientific 
developments of vaccines that would prevent and eventually eliminate a deadly bacteria or virus. 
1.2 Rise in Critical Reception 
There has been critical reception to both of these ethics and broader trends in 
environmental ethics in general.  One of the worries is that the individual, micro-level 
perspective is underappreciated or ignored.  Both Land Ethic and Deep Ecology are ​disembodied 8
approaches to the human-nature relation. They do not take into account an individual’s 
experience as a physical body within a physical location. On examination, it does not seem that 
one’s lived experience of nature always includes harmony, continuation, or homogeneity that an 
extended biotic community might suggest.  The danger of not acknowledging the body as a 
foundation for any sort of relatedness is that real human experiences and voices can be 
7 Deep Ecology was first coined by Arne Naess in “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement: A Summary,” in ​The Selected Works of Arne Naess, ​ed. Alan Drengson (Netherlands: Springer, 2005), 
2263-2269.  
8 Simon P. James discusses the importance of personal experience in environmental ethics in the 
introduction of his book, ​The Presence of Nature: A Study in Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy​, 




overlooked or silenced.  Many critiques of the disembodied view are countered by a variety of 
embodiment theories advanced by ecophenomenology. 
The budding field of environmental ethics known as ecophenomenology has critiqued 
disembodied approaches and replaced them with an embodied view.  Ecophenomenology is 
predicated on the belief that valuation of the environment must assess human relatedness to 
nature by examining the lived experience of nature.  In the introductory chapter of 
Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, ​the editors comment on how a disembodied 
understanding of environmental ethics distances environmental concern from personal life: 
“Because of accepted mainstream green lingo and removal of real science from everyday people, 
the public feels like we are solving the problems without having to reevaluate or modify personal 
life; eco-phenomenology is contrarian, asking each individual to examine their own personal 
experience.”  Assuming that the concept of ‘Nature’ is based on constructed assumptions, 9
phenomenologists attempt to deconstruct ideologies by beginning at one’s lived experience. 
Simon P. James describes the methodology of ecophenomenologists, “The first thing to note is 
that environmental phenomenologists seek to elucidate what is often referred to as our lived 
experience of nature, nature as it discloses itself to us in the living of our lives… To do this, they 
set themselves the task of bracketing or putting out of play certain entrenched second-order or 
theoretical conceptions of what nature is...”   Particular emphasis has been placed on the body, 10
an important influence by embodiment phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty.  Important scholars 
that advance ecophenomenology include Simon P. James, Charles Brown, David Abrams and 
Ted Toadvine. I focus my research on Ted Toadvine. 
9 Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine, eds. ​Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself ​(Albany, NY: 
State University Press, 2003), ix-x.  








1.3 Toadvine’s Proposal of Embodiment  
Ted Toadvine proposes an alternative version of ecophenomenology.  He is a particularly 
compelling ecophenomenologist because he argues that any ethic must account for the lived 
experience of difference.  As bodies, we are restricted both physically and epistemologically. 
What we can know is limited.  All actions, therefore, should come out of an awareness of the 
constant unknown, which can be described as everything that is epistemologically inaccessible in 
a single moment.  Toadvine questions the natural attitude of previous ethicists.  The natural 
attitude is made up of assumptions, beliefs, conceptions, and bodily dispositions that become 
common sense through repetition.  The convincing ‘naturalness’ of natural attitudes can stunt 
self-reflection, epistemological growth, and understanding of human relations. It can prevent 
critical thinking about both self and world.  In environmental ethics, the natural attitude has 
caused ethicists to ignore the experience of difference that surrounds us at all times.   His 11
concept of embodiment requires that we acknowledge the existence of difference that is always 
present but can never be known.  Toadvine asserts that the adoption of his embodied view, a 
concept of difference that has been underappreciated if not ignored, is the key to understanding 
the relatedness of a human to their environment.  This is critical to any successful environmental 
ethic. 
1.4 ​Virtue of Attunement: ​A Revision of Embodiment  
Although Toadvine’s embodied ethic is promising and I incorporate many of his ideas 
including the​ Ontology of Sense ​and ​chiasma​, there is a deficiency in his view of difference 
11 Although all ecophenomenologists draw from lived experience, not all include a conception of 
difference, which is why Toadvine is particularly compelling.  An example of a prominent ecophenomenologist who 
falls into a monistic worldview is David Abrams, ​The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a 





(what he calls ​Il y a).​ I argue that his totalizing view of difference ultimately disempowers the 
body.  Instead of using the body to know difference, Toadvine’s ethics only asks us to 
acknowledge its existence.  He stops before difference and admires its elusiveness.  I think that 
Toadvine fails to appreciate the possibility of demystifying and learning more about various 
aspects of difference. Self-cultivation strategies contribute to, and engender the probability of the 
openness to perceptual awareness of difference.  This perspective should be included, discussed, 
and examined in any approach to environmental ethics and the relation of human and 
environment.  While Toadvine may be right that we can never completely overcome difference, I 
suggest and emphasize that through certain self-cultivations strategies, there are ways to become 
increasingly aware of our natural attitudes and attune more attentively to the world around us. In 
search of alternative views of embodiment that appreciate the ability to transform and learn about 
both oneself and others, I turn to Yuasa Yasuo. 
Yuasa is an embodiment ethicist who presents a historically influenced concept of the 
body.  Through repeated bodily practices, one can overcome some of the natural attitudes and 
gain increased perceptual awareness of the surrounding world.  Examples of embodied practices 
have and do exist in many places throughout history, but I choose to focus on the specific 
embodied approaches presented by Yuasa. Yuasa enters into dialogue well with Toadvine 
because he uses the same phenomenological discourse while being firmly placed in the religious, 
cultural, and academic framework of modern Japan.  I draw on Yuasa’s interpretation of 





While Toadvine, Yuasa, and I all agree in the rootedness of the body in the world, Yuasa 
has a different picture of embodiment that is useful in my alternative picture of difference. 
Yuasa firmly places his concept of the body inside of a historical and cultural framework.  His 
ideas of repetition and historical body seem to be exactly what is lacking in Toadvine’s totalizing 
and universal body.  Knowing that bodies are culturally constructed, a virtue-centric revision of 
embodiment has much promise.  The virtue of learning about the Other through self-cultivations 
and awareness of the self requires both practice and repetition of the body.  
My thesis argues that Ted Toadvine’s ecophenomenology presents a concept of 
difference that is totalizing and has a concept of the body that is a-historical and universal.  By 
using Yuasa Yasuo’s ideas that the body is culturally constructed and can be reconstituted 
through repeated bodily practices, I revise Toadvine’s totalizing difference, emphasizing that we 
can use our bodies to increasingly learn about difference.  I call this a ​Virtue of Attunement. 
Self-cultivation practices are an essential part of an embodied ecophenomenology.  It not 
only enables the existence of difference, but also gives us a practical option of responding with 
our bodies to learn more about it.  The responsibility to increasingly understand our environment 
falls on an individual, empowering the body, agency, and capacity for compassion on a very 
personal level. 
In the following section, I give a detailed outline of Toadvine’s philosophy because much 
of my work is based off of his model.  I articulate his three main points which include the 
Ontology of Sense, chiasma, and ​Il y a. ​After a presentation of Toadvine, I outline specific 
problems with his conception of embodiment and difference. The third section proposes a 




Toadvine. I outline Yuasa’s Body-Scheme and concept of ​shugyo ​(self-cultivation) from which I 
draw my revised account of embodiment.  Using both Toadvine and Yuasa, I make conclusions 
about a virtue-centric ecophenomenology and its promise for encountering difference.  In the last 
section, I address the broader conclusions that a Virtue of Attunement has on environmental 
ethics. 
Ted Toadvine:  Ecophenomenology of Difference 12
In my summary of Toadvine’s proposal, it is important to recognize that his three basic 
themes, the Ontology of Sense, chiasma, and ​Il y a, ​all play fundamentally important roles in his 
picture of embodied perception, which is the center of his picture of ecophenomenology.  I 
explore them extensively because much of his thought is incorporated into my own work.  The 
Ontology of Sense presents the argument that sense is rooted in perception or, in other words, 
that perception is inescapably rooted in the body.  For Toadvine, this is the distinction between 
an embodied and disembodied view. After understanding his theory of the embodied quality of 
perception, I look at how Toadvine describes the lived perception of difference.  By employing 
the relational structure called the chiasma​, ​Toadvine explains the perceptual awareness of 
difference that breaks homogeneity presented by other ethicists.  Finally, I look at Toadvine’s 
understanding of difference.  ​Il y a ​is Toadvine’s ontological claim that the world which we 
experience is a world of difference.  
Ted Toadvine is looking for an environmental ethic that does not succumb to 
homogeneity, common in many contemporary approaches of describing the relationship between 
12 Ted Toadvine is the head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oregon, where he also 
teaches in the Environmental Studies Department. He specializes in Continental Philosophy, philosophy of nature, 
and environmental ethics.  Toadvine has written and edited important works on Merleau-Ponty, and has been a 




humans and nature.  He says, “…an ethics of nature cannot be developed on the basis of kinship, 
continuity, or homogeneity… This is not to deny the necessity of traditional ethical inquiry or 
practical activism, but simply to suggest that the attempt to ground such an ethics on a 
metaphysically homogenous substratum be displaced by a phenomenology of the 
impossible—that is, by an attentiveness to the resistance of what cannot be thought or perceived, 
to the opacity of a wild being that circumscribes our concepts and percepts.”  Toadvine is trying 13
to find a relationship between humans and nature that not only includes difference, but where 
difference is the basis of the relationship. 
An embodiment view is important to an environmental ethic that wants to address the 
lived experience and relationship between an individual and nature. It posits a practical view that 
demands that the body is essential in any relation between self and other.  Toadvine’s version of 
embodiment is particularly important to ecophenomenology because it addresses the problem of 
difference that shapes our perception. 
2.1 Ontology of Sense 
Toadvine argues from an embodied perspective, which is one’s inescapable rootedness in 
the body.  The Ontology of Sense posits that if sense is rooted in perception and perception is 
rooted in the body, sense is bound into our existence as embodied beings.  Sense is the 
physiological capacities of sensing organisms that give rise to perception.  Although there is a 
physiological sensing of the world, it is immediately filtered through screens of interpretation, 
identification, and representation, otherwise known as perception.  For Toadvine, sense is the 
13 Ted Toadvine, “The Primacy of Desire and its Ecological Consequences,” in ​Ecophenomenology: Back 




key that connects the human with the surrounding world, yet it cannot be isolated from 
perception.  There is an inescapable rootedness of perception in sense.  
Perception can only occur by virtue of our sensing organs: eyes, ears, nose, mouth, skin. 
This vision of embodiment, that perception is inescapably rooted in the body, is shared by many 
ecophenomenologists. The body has the capacity to sense, perceive, and is the vessel through 
which we transmit and receive data to and from the surrounding world. It is the foundation for 
any environmental ethic. 
Sense, Toadvine argues, is reacting to a physical world in which all bodies are engulfed. 
The surrounding physical world is what he calls Nature.  Through sense, humans and nature 
connect.  If one could isolate sense from perception momentarily, sense would exist and function 
before any human-made distinction between nature and interpretation occur: “…sense is 
ontologically basic…the ​telos​ of sense lies at a level deeper than the separation of nature and 
subjectivity.”   One’s ability to sense is what fundamentally connects us to the world; it allows 14
us to participate with the world through the vehicle of our body.  
However, sense cannot be removed from immediate perception.  The human-nature 
connection is not continuous, as other environmental ethicists present in more monistic 
portrayals. Drawing from one’s lived experience, rather, the connection is incomplete, what 
Toadvine calls ruptured. We cannot possibly know the depths of our surroundings, and even the 
things that are sensed are not completely accessible to us because of our interpretative filters. 
Even though sense responds directly to nature, our perception of sense prevents us from a full 
expression of nature itself.  
14 Ted Toadvine, “Singing the World in a New Key: Merleau-Ponty and the Ontology of Sense,” ​Janus 




Toadvine, however, not only says that sense touches nature but that it is ontologically a 
part of it.  He draws from Merleau-Ponty stating that, “sense is transferred from nature to 
language through the medium of the body.”   This suggests that sense is something that belongs 15
to nature, and can be translated into language through the body.  In other words, without our 
bodies we would not be able to sense at all and therefore unable to interact with nature.  Sense 
requires that our bodies are rooted in the world, and consequentially, any expression of this 
sense, whether it take the form of language, action, behaviors, or art, is nature reflecting back on 
itself and expressing itself on its own terms.  Expression is any response of the body to its 
embedded position in the world.  Toadvine says, “The reawakening of the experience of the body 
as a ‘natural self,’ then, is in the service of reawakening our experience of the sensible world, 
which is fundamentally—ontologically—a movement of expression.”  We are already in the 16
process of perception and thought, so expression is a constantly happening state. It is inevitably 
occurring.  According to Toadvine, expression occurs because of the encounter of others 
different from the self.  Before elaborating more on the characteristics of expression, I will delve 
into the relationship towards the other that is central in Toadvine’s ecophenomenology.  
That our perception is fundamentally rooted in the body is important to any 
environmental ethic.  It takes into consideration the importance of lived experience. Any ethic 
that disregards this notion is in danger of a disembodied account that depreciates the individual 
role in relating to self and other.  The Ontology of Sense firmly grounds Toadvine into the school 
of embodiment.  Toadvine goes beyond other ecophenomenologists, however, because he 
focuses on the lived experience of encountering difference.  Through a deconstruction of that 
15 Toadvine, “Singing,” 276. 





experience, Toadvine presents an explanation for the perceptual awareness of difference that 
breaks through the homogeneity that other environmental ethicists including other 
ecophenomenologists have failed to address.  Toadvine calls this the chiasma, drawing and 17
expanding upon Merleau-Ponty.  The chiasma is the description of how difference is perceived. 
2.1.1 Chiasma. ​Toadvine argues that the ​chiasmic relationship​ between humans and 
nature allow for difference.  Instead of a harmonious body of nature of which we are an 
extension, it is a cacophony of atonal sound: “...even if all expressions could give voice at once, 
the result would not be cosmic harmony but cacophony, since the perspectives they represent are 
incompossible [​sic​]…”   The chiasmic structure is a term that describes two bodies that become 18
sensible to one another in the lived world.  There is a point of connection when sensation 
intersects, then relays information to each subject.  Although there is a meeting point that allows 
for much potential empathy, the first person can never entirely know how the other is 
experiencing the encounter from their perspective.   Merleau-Ponty, from whom Toadvine draws 
upon, describes such a meeting: “I see your image, but you don’t see how I see you and vice 
versa. And no matter how far we advance in our mutual understanding, as much as we reflect, so 
much will we be different.”  Although there is an interaction in space (which at times are 19
mutually-explicit exchanges), the interaction will always be at least two-sided; the gap of 
difference is never crossed.  Chiasma, therefore, allows two separate, embodied entities to 
interact in space without collapsing into one another, as a homogeneous framework has a 
17 An example can be found in Toadvine’s critique of David Abrams homogeneous ecophenomenology. 
Abrams played an important role in popularizing ecophenomenology to readers outside of environmental ethics.  To 
read Toadvine’s critique, look at “Limits of the Flesh: The Role of Reflection in David Abram’s 
Ecophenomenology,” ​Environmental Ethics ​27 no. 2 (2005): 155-170. 
18 Toadvine, “Singing,”​ ​280. 




tendency to do. It also implies that the difference between the two embodied entities can never 
fully be overcome.  
While difference cannot be overcome, encountering the other’s characteristics does give 
insight about the characteristics of the self.  For example, I gain awareness of my body relative to 
the other. Let’s say that I accidently bump into a tree. I am suddenly aware of the sensation of 
my arm that has hit the tree, my arm which was out of mind and, in that moment, inaccessible to 
me. But by hitting the other I become aware of my arm.  The rough solidity of the bark also 
brings awareness of the opposing qualities in my arm.  My arm is soft and malleable in 
comparison.  Toadvine uses this chiasmic encounter to address the human-nature relationship: 
“To reconsider the being of nature is also to reconsider our own being, and the moment when the 
being of nature and of the human cross.  It is this moment of crossing, the becoming-nature of 
humanity and the becoming-human of nature to which Merleau-Ponty applies the term chiasma.”
  ​It is by encountering the other that one compares their relatedness and thus learns about the 20
self. 
The other implication is that while an encounter with the Other brings about new 
realizations, another world of knowledge closes.  As my attention turns to the qualities of my 
arm hitting against the tree, I loose perception of other elements.  My arm that has hit the tree, 
above, has caused me to forget about the persisting ache of my foot. Awareness of other parts of 
my body, other thoughts, ideas, desires, etc. that I might have had moments before suddenly 
disappear into a distant horizon.  




Toadvine’s notion of difference separates him from other ecophenomenologists. 
Difference of others is always present, preventing a monistic worldview suggested by other 
environmental ethicists.  Additionally, there are complexities in our own bodies that disallow the 
ability to experience continuity even in ourselves. This totalizing and invasive vision of 
difference is distinct from other embodied ecophenomenologists. The consequence of the 
chiasma, for Toadvine, is that we are embedded in a world of unconquerable difference of the 
unknown. The ontological claim that the world we experience is one of difference is what 





2.2 ​Il y a 
What separates Toadvine from other ecophenomenologists is his concept of difference. 
Toadvine is concerned with the lived experience that nature resists to be known.  The resistance 
of nature is Toadvine’s response to other environmental ethicists, including phenomenologists, 
who often present a monistic framework.  An example Toadvine’s difference is laid out in his 
essay called “The Primacy of Desire​.​”  21
The methodology in “The Primacy of Desire” is to deconstruct phenomenology itself in 
order to understand how we value nature.  In doing so, he goes as far as to deconstruct embodied 
perception itself.   He begins with familiar criticisms towards environmental ethicists who have a 
tendency to sympathize with a monistic relationship between humans and the environment. 
However, the lived human experience of nature does not show only harmony, but discontinuity, 
struggle, and resistance.  In his philosophy, he wants to include that, first, all value is a human 
construction; and second, that the natural world has value in itself.  If humans and nature are 
ontologically connected by sense, the human process of value could perhaps be an extension of 
the evaluative processes of nature. 
Through a process of anti-reduction to either side, he deconstructs phenomenology in 
order to understand how to value nature. Toadvine appropriates Merleau-Ponty’s concept that all 
interaction between self and world occurs at the body through sensual perception, and that this 
interaction is a bodily dialogue between the perceiver and the perceived through the chiasmic 
structure.  He gives agency to both parties involved, saying that there is a reciprocal dialogue of 
information.  But even before the interchange of data can occur through the chiasmic encounter, 




the perceiver’s senses must first be summoned; there is an ‘invisible calling’ of the perceived 
thing itself. The calling or solicitation for attention by the perceived thing is what opens the 
world to perception.  Yet, as soon as the perceiving begins, the calling cannot be seen. Although 
he has found it through a phenomenological method, the thing itself escapes a phenomenological 
inquiry.  This is the true exterior, the world outside of perception. 
He focuses on Merleau-Ponty for his work on the visible/invisible and the concept of ​Il y 
a​, which is the “existence without being;” the something you find in nothing. He says that 
phenomenology has led us to the idea of the calling, but it is impossible to experience it because 
it lies outside of experience. This thing beyond perception is the answer to the resistance that 
interrupts an ​otherwise monistic world​: “I suggest that ​Il y a ​is the soil of the desire and 
resistance animating what is otherwise a monistic ontology.”  22
It seems that at the horizon of our bodies there is the constant threat of difference. There 
is infinite difference in others – it is reasonable to say that I can never know what it is like to be 
another from their perspective.  But for Toadvine, the difference is much closer, it is at the 
constant horizon of our bodies.  For example, as I concentrate on the ache in my foot, I lose 
access to the awareness of most other parts of the body.  How does my arm feel swinging in 
space? What characteristics does my stomach have?  How is my posture today? The list of things 
is infinite but as I concentrate on the ache in my foot, the other concerns disappear into the 
horizon of unknown.  Even if I have all my attention on my aching foot, as soon as my arm 
bumps into a tree, all that attention potentially disappears as the world of perception occurs in 




regards to my arm interacting with the world.  The world of difference is constantly on the 
horizon, pushing into the peripheries of our bodies at all times.  
 Il y a ​is the ontological claim that the world in which our bodies are embedded is one of 
difference.  Toadvine does not fear or dread ​Il y a​, but celebrates it.  Without difference, one 
would not be able to have individual expressions.  As stated earlier, expression is the body’s 
response to its embedded-ness in the world that can manifest as language, action, behavior, or 
art, for example.  ​Il y a ​provides a space for expression to occur.  Expressive movements depend 
on the assumption that other identities can never be truly known.  They are born out of the gap of 
difference, “it is through expression that a relation of distance can paradoxically be a proximity. 
If expression is the bond between nature and culture, this is because it is neither a relation of 
resemblance nor of representation…it is precisely the ‘failure’ of identity that opens sense as a 
movement of expression.”  Expression is the result of the human-nature interaction: “Everything 23
comes to pass as if expression arose through the world’s striving to be perceived, to be painted, 
spoken, and thought.  My body’s struggle to express would then be nothing other than the 
world’s struggle to express itself through me, as if I were an organ of this single massive body 
named Nature.”  It seems that humans are nature’s engines of self-expression, the ability to look 24
back on itself. He further says that besides the gap of difference, there is otherwise no other 
“ontological break between expression and expressed,”  and difference is necessary for 25
movement, action, thought, and response to the world. Expression involves an attitude towards 
nature on nature’s own terms, using the subject as the body for expression.  Toadvine describes 
23 Toadvine, ​Merleau-Ponty, ​126-127. 
24 Toadvine, “Singing,”​ ​279. 




the extension of nature through humans and vice versa: “the world thinks itself in me, if I am its 
consciousness.”  26
Il y a ​is Toadvine’s picture of totalizing difference. By attuning into ​Il y a,​ Toadvine 
believes that there can be an environmental ethic that is neither reduced to monistic frameworks 
nor frameworks that ignore the human lived experience of difference.  
2.3 Problems of an Impossible Ecophenomenology 
Toadvine’s philosophy is still coming to fruition and more work will surely further 
complete his ideas.  However, based on his material thus far, I will point out a few problems with 
Toadvine’s view of embodiment and difference. I argue that while Toadvine presents a 
promising embodied environmental ethics of difference, he fails to appreciate the capacity of the 
body to cultivate increased awareness of difference.  
Toadvine is convincing in many aspects and raises important concerns of how an 
embodied environmental ethic might acknowledge the world of difference in which we are 
embedded.  His celebration of difference, however, is so totalizing that it mystifies difference 
into a pseudo-religious realm that cannot be overcome.  This impossible environmental ethic 
actually works against itself because it does not give any options for the body.  Toadvine’s 
difference is total and transcendent. It escapes rational analysis of the mind and perceptual 
analysis of the body.  We are left at an impasse, where the body itself has been deconstructed and 
is no longer useful in attempts to understand the resistance of nature.  While I agree that 
Merleau-Ponty’s anti-reductionist approach wants to include difference, it is unlikely that the 
difference is so totalizing that it disembodies the philosophy itself.  Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty 




discusses how phenomenology can transform the body, suggesting that the body has an active 
role in epistemological awareness. In Toadvine’s ecophenomenology, there is no opportunity to 
embark on a process of increasing knowledge on difference.  While difference can never be 
completely understood or overcome, the capacity to become increasingly aware of difference 
does not seem unreasonable.  The body can perhaps be habituated to be more or less sensitive to 
the difference that surrounds it. The capacity of the body, in my opinion, is underappreciated in 
Toadvine’s impossible phenomenology.  An embodied approach to environmental ethics is 
critical if we are to include the human lived experience of nature and be reflective of human 
constructed values of nature and our surrounding world.  Further, it is necessary for personal 
normative responses to the environment. 
The second problem of Toadvine is his concept of the body that is universalizing and 
a-historical.  He does not acknowledge that bodies are shaped by history, culture, and personal 
practices.  Instead, his timeless concept of the body lies in a complete world of difference and 
has little agency.  He does not explain how bodies, with various understandings of difference, 
might approach ​Il y a.​  ​Il y a ​itself is a concept that arises within a certain time and place, a result 
of changing epistemological history and ideas.  An embodied ethic needs to account for 
transformative concepts of the body as human-constructed notions of the body and the world 
change.  
Finally, Toadvine’s ethics do not call for normative responses of the body.  His ethics 
merely ask that we acknowledge that this is a world of difference, but does not call for any action 
beyond that.  I suggest that not only are we bodies but, more importantly, we can use the body to 




constructed, a virtue ethic could potentially help to shape our body in a way that encounters 
difference with increasing sensitivity.  Value could be put on methods of bodily action and 
cultivation. I propose that through self-cultivation practices, the body can attune to and learn 
about difference. I call such an ethic a Virtue of Attunement​.  
My amendments to Toadvine’s self-cultivation strategies are supplemented by Yuasa 
Yasuo’s self-cultivation strategies.  By engaging with Yuasa’s conception of the body, I attempt 
to revise Toadvine’s view of totalizing difference, bringing agency and appreciation to the 
practical capacity of the body in a modified version of environmental ethics. 
Virtue of Attunement​: Contributions of Embodied Practices to Ecophenomenology 
Environmental ethics needs to take into account that we are undeniably rooted in the 
world.  This embodied approach is the foundation of ecophenomenology.  As embodied beings, 
we find ourselves embedded in a world of difference, a perspective ignored by popular trends in 
environmental ethics that seek a homogeneous framework. Toadvine’s concept of ​Il y a ​claims 
that the world we live in is, in fact, a world of difference.  In an attempt to extend on Toadvine’s 
work, I propose that not only do we live in a world of difference, but we can use our bodies to 
attune to difference, opening up to greater epistemological perspectives. There are practices of 
the body that can be cultivated in order to become more aware of self and world.  I turn away 
from Toadvine’s totalizing difference and, instead, emphasize lived practices of the body where 
embodied habits can increasingly learn about difference, inspired by Yuasa’s embodiment 
theory.  I will first reiterate problems with Toadvine and my proposed solution, engaging Yuasa 
into the conversation.  Second, I will elaborate on Yuasa’s key points which include 




shugyo, ​Yuasa’s interpretation of self-cultivation practices.  Finally, I will conclude with the 
concept of a Virtue of Attunement​ ​and its implications on environmental ethics as a whole. 
3.1 An Alternative to Ted Toadvine: Self-Cultivation Practices 
The most pertinent problem is changing Toadvine’s view of totalizing difference. I 
propose that not only do we live in a world of difference, we can use our bodies to attune to 
difference. A body that can change its deposition to be more sensitive to difference, as I argue, 
must be a body that is historically and culturally constructed.  It has to be capable of change. The 
second adaptation to Toadvine is re-conceptualizing the body from a universal and 
de-historicized one to another that is explicitly shaped by context. By establishing that the body 
is culturally constructed, I propose that an embodied virtue ethic can habituate the body in 
context to become sensitive to its encounter with difference. This is a self-cultivation practice 
contribution to ecophenomenology. 
My proposal draws largely from Yuasa Yasuo.  His theory of embodiment is one that is 
explicitly shaped by a particular culture. He states that Japanese religions, history, and 
philosophy  influences his picture of the body.  Furthermore, he provides specific examples of 27
self-cultivation strategies as a method of attunement that opens the subject up to new 
epistemological perspectives. In Yuasa’s case, he draws from bodily practices that he has 
encountered from his cultural context.  Through habituation, the body can transform itself, 
opening up for opportunities to perceive the world in new ways not previously or consistently 
available.  He explicitly values greater epistemological perspectives and therefore values the 
method and process of ​attuning ​the body to make epistemological growth possible.  The 
27 For my purposes, I wish to underline Yuasa’s indebtedness to phenomenology, especially of Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty.  However, by no means are these his only Western influences, he openly draws from other 




emphasis on embodied interactions with difference takes greater centrality over ontological 
claims of difference transcendent from the lived experience.  
The revisions may assist to construct a more comprehensive environmental ethic.  I use 
Toadvine’s chiasmic structure so that beings in the world can connect through interaction 
without a monistic collapse.  However, Yuasa’s description of the body and bodily practices can 
provide specific examples of how to habitually dispose one’s bodies to more fulfilling chiasmic 
relationships.  It is more fulfilling because the transforming body can be more aware of greater 
nuances in occurring chiasmic relationships that lead to greater sensitivity to difference. 
Additionally, by being more attuned to the world, it is possible to engage in dialogue or 
interactions (through chiasmic relationships) with subjects or bodies that were often ignored, 
overlooked, or unavailable before.  It uncovers some of the blind-spots in personal assumptions 
and knowledge, allowing space to listen to difference.  Bodily cultivations can create at ethic of 
observation and attunement that change how one can live in relation to and interact with the 
world though the extent of the openness may depend on the practice. Yuasa can contribute to 
Toadvine’s uncertainties by providing a method of embodied transformations that lead to a ​lived 
embodied environmental ethic. 
These practices are part of cultural and religious history that transforms a particular 
culturally-defined body, leading to the second contribution of Yuasa to Toadvine. By being 
explicit about his religious and cultural frameworks, history, and influences, Yuasa moves away 
from Toadvine’s a-historical and essentializing concept of a body to a specific example of how 




which will be used in my revised embodied environmental ethics which I call a Virtue of 
Attunement​. 
3.2 Yuasa  28
In his work, ​The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory,  ​Yuasa examines several 29
contemporary Japanese philosophers, historical religious figures, and Western thinkers that help 
to influence and shape his conception of the body.  These include the scholars Watsuji and 
Nishida, Buddhist figures Dogen and Kukai, and Continental thinker Merleau-Ponty. 
3.2.1 Body-Scheme. ​The concept of a Body-Scheme is first found in Merleau-Ponty.   It 30
is a way to categorize different functions of the body without necessarily isolating separate parts 
but rather highlighting them for linguistic clarity, acknowledging the constant interactions and 
influences of one organ or function over another.  Yuasa takes Merleau-Ponty’s structure and 
splits the body into four circuits for examination.  The first circuit is the Sensory-Motor Circuit. 
It involves sensory organs (skin, eyes, nose, ears, and tongue) that directly receives and responds 
to external stimuli.  The second circuit deals with muscle memory.   Habituated bodily actions 31 32
are stored or remembered in muscles.  Once embodied memory is attained, it does not always 
need conscious attention or exertion of the intentional mind, but are habituated to work 
28  Yuasa Yasuo (1925-2005) was a contemporary Japanese scholar whose prolific and varied work was 
interdisciplinary and comparative.  He wrote on a wide range of topics including Japanese history, psychology, 
comparative ethics and religion, and mind-body philosophy, and published over fifty books. Yuasa was deeply 
influenced by his advisor Watsuji Tetsuro whose work concentrated on the ethics of the community. The importance 
of communal and relational humans becomes critical in Yuasa’s conception of a body within a cultural context. 
Yuasa continues the academic tradition of both Watsuji’s and Nishida Kitaro’s comparative philosophical work 
from Japanese and European traditions.  
29 Yuasa Yasuo, ​The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory,​ ed. T.P. Kasulis,​ ​trans. Nagatomo 
Shigenori and T.P. Kasulis (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987). 
30 For more reading, examine Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology,” 
in ​Phenomenology of Perception, ​trans. Colin Smith​ ​(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), 73-90. 
31 Nagatomo, “Yuasa’s Body-Scheme,” in ​Attunement of the Body (​Albany, NY: State University of New 
York, 1992), 60. This essay was originally a lecture by Professor Nagatomo summarizing Yuasa’s body-scheme.  It 
is now printed as a chapter in Nagatomo’s book ​Attunement of the Body​. 




intuitively.  Such examples could be playing a familiar song on the piano that does not require 
active mental effort because the finger muscles have already memorized the song.  Yuasa is 
drawing from Merleau-Ponty’s idea of ​habit-body  or embodied knowledge.  The third circuit in 33
Yuasa’s Body-Scheme is the Emotion-Instinct circuit.   He discusses how emotional states such 34
as stress or anger can affect certain organs.  For example, stress often increases breath rate in the 
lungs, which consequently increases heart rate (and vice versa), which can further stimulate or 
restrict digestive organs.  It is known that stress can cause digestive problems because it puts the 
body into ​fight or flight​ mode.  The result is that digestion becomes secondary to what the body 
believes to be an immediate danger. The modern human body is often put under abnormal states 
of prolonged stress.  The Emotion-Instinct Circuit is usually subconscious in one’s everyday 
lived experience. An individual is not usually aware of the extent that emotional states influence 
and impact the body.  It is here that Yuasa begins his work on self-cultivation or​ shugyo.  ​By 
becoming aware of the interactions of the body, the barriers between each circuit becomes more 
transparent.  Habituated actions, such as breathing practices, attune one to the changes of lung 
function and thus increasingly nuanced emotional states of the self.    While the first circuit 
(sensory organs) is easy to recognize and use with intention, the higher the circuit number, the 
more inaccessible it becomes.  Hearing is more obvious and conscious than muscle memory, 
which in turn is more transparent than emotional influences on the body.  Nagatomo describes 
Yuasa’s different circuits by their accessibility to be understood: “the difference in control 
correlates with an awareness of the body which decreases in transparency.”   In other words, the 35
greater one understands a circuit, the greater ability one has to manipulate it.  
33 Merleau-Ponty, ​Phenomenology of Perception, ​142-147. 
34 Nagatomo, 63-64. 




While the third circuit, the Emotional-Instinct Circuit, is the most ambiguous of the three 
mentioned, it is not always obscured beyond recognition.  Depending on each person’s 
sensitivity, awareness of how emotions are influencing the body (or vice versa) can be 
occasional or even frequent.  However, there is a fourth circuit that is absolutely invisible until 
one begins self-cultivations practices such as those found in Japanese religious frameworks.  The 
fourth circuit, which Yuasa calls the Unconscious Quasi-Body, is not accessed through the 
everyday lived experience. 
Although I will, for now, not go into detail about Yuasa’s concept of Ki-meridians 
(energy centers often addressed in traditional Japanese and Chinese medicine), it is interesting 
that both Toadvine and Yuasa appropriate Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the visible and 
the invisible.   While Toadvine calls the invisible the characteristic of nature that will always be 36
invisible from perception and causes metaphysical difference, Yuasa sees the invisible only as a 
temporary.  Through self-cultivation practice, one can overcome the natural attitude and make 
visible the previously inaccessible circuit of Unconscious Quasi-Body. 
3.2.2 ​Shugyo: ​Self-Cultivation. ​Self-cultivation enhances the awareness (mind) of each 
circuit (body) and the fluidity between them.  Nagatomo describes the purpose of ​shugyo ​is to 
“enhance the degree of correlativity between the movements of mind and those of body… 
ultimately it produces the spiritual goal of developing an all-round personality.”   One’s 37
emotional and mental states affect how one understands their position in the world and the things 
happening around them.  They shape how we generate meaning.  By understanding how 
36 ​The Visible and the Invisible ​was Merleau-Ponty’s final project at the time of his death.  The 
uncompleted work is a contentious piece and has been interpreted by scholars in a variety of ways. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, ​The Visible and the Invisible,​ ed. Claude Leforte, trans. Alphonso Lingus (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968). 




emotional tides change the generation of meaning, it gives one more agency to deflate emotional 
influence among other personal assumptions and, instead, be more sensitive to the outside world. 
Although filtration of perception by the subject is inevitable, self-cultivation is a means of 
providing the subject more agency to choose one’s filters.  It also assumes that there is an 
objective world outside of the body, known as the ​inter-subjective  world, where multiple 38
subjects interact and respond through the chiasmic relationship.  Self-cultivation practices 
presented by Yuasa cause a subject to move towards an attunement and sensitivity to the 
inter-subjective space through greater understanding and unification of the body. 
Increased control of emotions must be done through habituation of body, not exercises of 
mind.   The body influences habits of the mind, including the way we value things in the 39
external world, or nature.  Although the word ‘control’ has strong connotations, what I think 
Yuasa means is that control is not a suppression of emotions but rather an awareness of different 
stimuli, influences, and reactions of and on the body. Additionally, control can allow one to 
choose which emotional states they would prefer to strengthen.  Nagatomo states, “If the 
negative emotion is always stressed, a pathological state will result, but on the other hand, if the 
positive emotion is always strengthened, it will nurture more mature psychological traits.”  40
While emotions are much more complex than simply negative or positive, Nagatomo makes a 
clear statement of how enhancing certain emotions transforms the body physically (through the 
strengthening of neural pathways) into one that is more likely to behave in  the world in what 
Yuasa deems a moral way.  Why embark in a body and personality transformation?  For Yuasa, 
38 For more information about inter-subjectivity, examine Merleau-Ponty, “The Phenomenal Field,” in 
Phenomenology of Perception. 
39 Nagatomo, 67. 




it provides for a greater epistemological perspective.  I argue that it also allows one to embody an 
ethic that discovers how one interacts with the world by understanding the habits of the body. 
An example of Yuasa’s self-cultivation practice is found in the example of meditation​. 
With practice, regulated and habituated breathing styles become familiar to the body.  Overtime, 
the body becomes habituated to regular breathing habits that become the normal response. 
Breathing becomes a resource during times of emotional stress.  For advanced practitioners, the 
body automatically brings the breath back to normal levels, and the feelings of stress, fear, or 
anger become more manageable and do not necessarily alter or distort how we see the world 
outside.  This instinctual behavior, which has become muscle memory, takes control of the 
action.  Yuasa categorizes this as ​dark conscious​.  Dark conscious is not unconscious, but rather 
the part of our consciousness that is not clear or completely at hand during normal reflection and 
processing.  It is here that emotions and instincts are habituated.  
 Yuasa outlines several historical versions of meditation, including those of Dogen and 
Kukai, proving that there are multiple ways to go about self-cultivation practices.  Other 
examples of ​shugyo ​that Yuasa includes are poetry, art, and martial arts.  His interest in 
meditation is that it “brings to the surface the complexities and emotions sunk in the unconscious 
region, freeing them and ultimately dissolving them by slowing the conscious activities 
connected with the cerebral functions.”   What he seems to be doing is empowering the dark 41
consciousness, which is perhaps the complexity of human nature that Toadvine finds resistant. 
The unreachable natural side of the human mind is what Yuasa calls dark consciousness.  Yuasa 
acknowledges the resistance found in Toadvine while also wishing to transform it.  His idea of 




body transformation directly addresses the difference because cultivation is a training of dark 
consciousness to take over main functions so that we act (or express) spiritually, creatively, and 
spontaneously.  Habituated practices shape dark conscious and the body so that it allows the 
resistance of nature to express itself on its own terms.  It cultivates Toadvine’s difference into 
controlled and meaningful expression. For Yuasa, the habituated body is the key to influencing 
how one lives in his or her landscape. 
3.3 Applying Yuasa to Toadvine 
Yuasa presents a conception of the body that appreciates historical formation.  He 
acknowledges that bodies are historically constructed but can be partially reshaped by 
self-cultivation practices. Yuasa’s embodiment ethic can contribute to the conversation by 
moving away from the fascination with difference, back to the possibilities of the body that 
encounters difference.  
Through repetitive self-cultivation practices, the body creates habits that can 
physiologically change the relationship between perception and processing, altering how we 
understand and value the external world and ourselves.  Yuasa proposes that through an 
attunement of body, one can interact with the world in a various manners that can move away 
from the natural attitude.  He notes that intentional changes in habituated mental processing, 
what I call the natural attitude, need to be addressed on the level of the body. In everyday 
experience, these emotional states are often largely unexamined yet influence our evaluation of 
the meanings of the external world.  The result is an automatic response to the external world 
that can exclude learning new perspectives on difference. For example, a lost and stressed person 




about to step on, someone pushes them out of the way and jumps into the bus first.  The typical 
reaction would likely be anger because of their stressed emotional deposition; they may fail to 
see that the other ran into the bus to tend to someone in distress.  While this may be an extreme 
example, it does seem that emotions color how we generate meaning.  In this case, their 
emotional state prevented them from seeing other happenings in their surrounding world. 
Through regulated breathing practices, however, Yuasa claims that emotions are not necessarily 
controlled, but noticed and acknowledged, preventing such an unconscious influence of emotion 
on perception, processing, and behavior. Breathing practices help to map one’s natural attitudes, 
giving one more agency in the generation of the meaning. Toadvine claims that paying attention 
to the resistant invisible quality of nature is the only way to “enjoy the full reality of the thing,”  42
though it is impossible to pay attention to it through body or thought.  Yuasa, on the other hand, 
shows that creating certain habits in the body can foster an understanding of reality that is not as 
influenced by emotional subjectivity.  
Yuasa puts explicit value on bodily responses, whereas Toadvine does not distinguish 
value between the modes of expression.  He states that the variety of response to the invisible 
quality of nature create a “cacophony” of simultaneous and incompatible voices.   However, it 43
seems important that in a lived philosophy, evaluative distinctions are made regarding human 
behavior.  My lived experience shows that some actions, thoughts, language, etc. are more 
hurtful and helpful than others. Yet, this is not accounted for in Toadvine’s description of 
expression. Yuasa would posit that a bodily practice leads to the more valuable form of 
expression.  
42 Toadvine, ​Merleau-Ponty​, 124. 




If we use Yuasa’s embodied ethic, there is a distinct change to my encounter with the 
tree, to reuse my example from earlier.  For Toadvine, every time I have an encounter with 
another, my attention changes from my headache and other concerns to the sensation of my arm. 
When one world of knowledge opens, another one closes, keeping me contained in a world of 
difference.  Using Yuasa’s conception of the body, however, I argue that I can understand 
difference with an entirely changed approach. For the person who has not undergone 
self-cultivation practices, natural attitudes will general kick in when hitting the tree.  For many, 
that may mean frustration with the tree, or turning all attention to the arm.  Toadvine sees this as 
unconquerable difference.  However, if one undergoes a practice like breathing habituation, 
bumping into the tree will result differently. Because fluster and frustration are very much a 
physiological response as they are emotional, there is increased heart rate and quickened 
breathing, a habituated breathing pattern of calm regulated breathing can prevent such an 
immediately distracting response.  These practices bring awareness to my arm bumping into the 
tree without necessarily closing off other worlds.  Because I prevented the frustration, I don’t 
necessarily have to forget about my headache. By practicing awareness of my own body, I 
engender the possibility to see other things occurring around me.  While I hit the tree, I can also 
notice birds flying out of the tree, or someone running over to help me.  Often, the natural 
attitude can create all sorts of blind-spots in an individual’s perception.  However, awareness of 
how these natural attitudes formulate and creating new habits that allow an attunement to the 
surrounding world posits another approach to encountering difference.  One world does not have 
to close when another one opens. Rather, for every seeing of something there is a potential to see 




and therefore gain new perspectives of the world of difference that surrounds us.  The capacity of 
the body to be aware of and learn about difference is as much, if not more so, a part of virtue as it 
is discovering the world of difference for the first time, as suggested by Toadvine. A Virtue of 
Attunement​ ​therefore attempts to overcome the natural attitude of Toadvine by appreciating the 
capacity of the body to gain increased epistemological perspectives on difference. 
3.4 Conclusions 
While Toadvine, Yuasa, and I all work out of embodiment theory, acknowledging that we 
are fundamentally embedded in the world, I disagree with Toadvine’s conception of difference. 
Instead of concluding that an environmental ethic should acknowledge that we live in a world of 
difference, I think that environmental ethics can use the body to learn more about difference, 
even though it can never be completely overcome.  The emphasis lies on learning and discovery. 
Any environmental ethic should include that bodies are culturally and historically constructed. 
That a body can change gives potential agency to reinterpret itself.  Yuasa says that the body can 
be restructured through self-cultivation strategies.  Yuasa contributes to Toadvine who has an 
a-historical view of the body and does know acknowledge that definitions of both body and 
difference​ can change over time. 
Because the body is historically formed, a virtue ethic is a promising approach to 
encountering difference.  By valuing the capacity of the body to change and learn, new habits are 
formed that appreciate difference in new ways.  It allows a space for other voices to come into 
the forefront, aspiring for those that are normally unheard or silenced.  While there will always 
be blind-spots, the aspiration to include difference is possible using Yuasa’s method of 




difference, but my revision of difference continues on by saying the body has a role and 
responsibility to encounter difference. 
Environmental concern has grown exponentially in recent years, proven clearly by 
political and social shifts to be more ‘green.’  However, embodied environmental ethics, 
especially of ecophenomenology, allows for personal embodied agency.  This can supplement 
the macro-level approaches to provide for a more rounded cultural approach to environmental 
ethics. 
Broader Conclusions on Environmental Ethics 
Self-cultivation practices have can play an important role in ecophenomenology. They 
appreciate the capacity to use the body in shaping lived experience, especially in encountering 
difference.  This falls under the larger category of an embodied environmental ethic.  Because 
environmental ethics deals with the world in which we are embedded, it must take into account 
our bodies.  Our bodies are what moves through the world and any environmental ethic that 
ignores the body is missing a critical component of how we experience our surroundings.  It can 
have unintended negative consequences such as ignoring human needs on both an individual and 
community level.  An embodied view is also essential in empowering the individual body in 
ethics.  It supplements both personal and institutional approaches to the responsibility to the 
environment. Institutional policies become more balanced when they take into consideration the 
importance of personal experiences of the environment.   They can help to address the problems 
communities face on the grounds. 
Finally, a Virtue of Attunement​ ​is important for encountering difference with respect, 




the world separately, but it is through observing, sensing, or ​attuning ​to the other by mapping 
one’s natural attitudes that one can become united through difference. Merleau-Ponty has theory 
that an attunement of one’s body is also an attunement to nature.  He says, “Whenever I try to 
understand myself, the whole fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it comes the 
others who are caught in it.”  Any environmental ethic that wants to appreciate others and 44
difference needs to understand precisely how the body is embedded in the world.  As the world 
becomes ever more global, it is important to embrace an ethic that leaves a space for difference, 
instead of trying to overpower or ignore it.  A Virtue of Attunement​ ​leaves space for difference 
and aspires for compassion and empathy.  It does not make difference exotic, nor does it collapse 
into difference to become a monistic worldview.  Rather, it opens up the possibility to encounter 
new types of difference.  By opening up the definition of environmental ethics, we can see how 
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